




Transparency in banking can be defined as “public disclo-
sure of reliable and timely information that enables users 
of that information to make an accurate assessment of 
a  bank’s  financial  condition  and  performance,  business 
activities,  risk  profile  and  risk  management  practices” 
(Basel  Committee,  1998).(1)  In  recent  years,  there  has 
been  greater  emphasis  on  bank  transparency  through 
new capital regulation (e.g. Pillar 3 of the Basel II frame-
work) and new accounting rules (e.g. the International 
Financial Reporting Standards). These regulatory initiatives 
have been motivated by the growing complexity of the 
financial system, which has led to an increase in banks’ 
opacity. 
The theme of transparency in banking is hardly new. Ten 
years ago, the Asian financial crisis had already prompted 
calls for greater transparency among banks. More recently, 
the subprime mortgage crisis has led to renewed interest 
in this topic. Indeed, some banks were severely criticised 
for not being transparent enough about their subprime-
related  exposures  and  for  the  relatively  slow  speed  at 
which  they  disclosed  write-downs  and  losses  following 
the outbreak of the crisis. To some extent, this lack of 
transparency may be due to the difficulty of valuing com-
plex instruments in a volatile environment characterised 
by low levels of liquidity. However, it may also be due 
to insufficient disclosure by banks about their valuation 
techniques or their accounting practices, for instance. As 
a result, it may be necessary to strengthen bank disclosure 
requirements.
This article discusses various issues involved with the con-
cept of bank transparency. It first reviews the benefits and 
costs  associated  with  transparency  before  detailing  the 
regulatory  approach  to  it  and  illustrating  its  importance 
in  the  context  of  the  recent  turmoil  in  credit  markets. 
Section 1 looks at the implications of bank transparency for 
financial stability and the incentives for banks to be more 
transparent. Section 2 details two important regulatory ini-
tiatives with respect to disclosure in banking : Pillar 3 of the 
Basel  II  framework  and  International  Financial  Reporting 
Standards. Section 3 looks at the role of banks’ disclosures 
during the subprime mortgage crisis and the impact that 
these disclosures have had on the crisis. It outlines some 
recent  suggestions  for  improvements  in  regulation  and 
market practices. The last section concludes. 
1.    Importance of transparency for 
financial stability and for banks 
This section examines the importance of bank transpa-
rency from a financial stability viewpoint, as well as banks’ 
incentives  to  be  more  transparent.  It  shows  that  bank 
transparency  can  enhance  financial  stability,  although 
“imperfections”  in  transparency  can  actually  have  the 
opposite effect. In addition, banks may not have sufficient 
incentives to be transparent ; therefore regulation may be 
warranted.
1.1    Impact of bank transparency on financial 
stability 
There is an extensive literature supporting the view that 
bank  transparency  has  a  beneficial  impact  on  financial 
stability. The main effect of transparency seems to be to 
reduce problems of asymmetry of information between 
(1)  According to the Basel Committee, there is thus a difference between the 
disclosure of information (“disclosure”) and the disclosure of reliable and 
timely information (“transparency”). In the remainder of this article, the terms 
“disclosure” and “transparency” are used interchangeably.
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banks on the one hand and depositors, market partici-
pants and supervisors on the other hand.(1) Lower asym-
metry information problems may in turn enhance financial 
stability, both in normal times (ex ante) and during periods 
of stress (ex post).
Ex ante :
–    Lower  information  asymmetries  may  increase  market 
discipline  on  banks  because  depositors,  market  par-
ticipants and supervisors may be better able to monitor 
banks and detect “bad” investment strategies or finan-
cial problems before they have a chance to do any harm 
(Basel Committee, 1998). As a result, banks’ risk-taking 
(moral hazard) may decline. 
Ex post :
–    Lower information asymmetries may reduce the prob-
ability  of  market  panics.  Indeed,  market  panics  are 
usually the result of unexpected or unquantifiable bad 
news. As pointed out by Moody’s (1998a), “bad news 
is never welcomed, but if unexpected or unquantifiable, 
it is taken more seriously, and reacted to with greater 
panic, than bad news that an investor can anticipate 
and  quantify  as  a  result  of  previous  disclosure”.  A 
similar type of argument is formalised by Gorton and 
Huang (2006), who assume that banks may be hit by 
both a systemic shock and a bank-specific shock, with 
depositors only being able to observe the former. This 
implies that, in the event of a bad realisation of the 
common systemic shock, all banks will face a depositor 
run. If banks are transparent enough to allow deposi-
tors to also observe the idiosyncratic shock, only a frac-
tion of the banks will be hit by a bank run.
–    Lower information asymmetries may ensure that institu-
tions which are certified to be sound in an accounting 
sense but which are in fact not healthy in an economic 
sense do not survive and do not contaminate the entire 
banking system, which would further aggravate a crisis 
and the costs of cleaning up the system. For instance, 
Moody’s (1998b) indicates that, during the Asian crisis, 
many banks booked additional loans to weak borro-
wers as current and performing. In a strict accounting 
sense, the loans were performing. Yet, because these 
loans had been made to borrowers who had already 
defaulted, and were therefore weak, in an economic 
sense,  they  should  have  been  classified  as  being  of 
doubtful quality.
–    Lower information asymmetries may help public author-
ities to better assess the potential implications of the 
failure  of  an  individual  institution  on  other  banks  or   
the market as a whole (Schinasi, 2005).
Even though the above-mentioned papers clearly point up 
the benefits of bank transparency for financial stability, 
other contributions explain why transparency may affect 
it adversely. Most of these adverse effects stem from the 
fact that transparency may not always be “perfect”. For 
instance, 
–    If transparency is “noisy”, e.g. if banks disclose partial 
information about their losses (or write-downs) instead 
of comprehensive information, it may be difficult for 
investors  to  infer  whether  single-loss  events  signal  a 
generally mispriced portfolio or just an extreme realisa-
tion in a correctly priced portfolio. Depending on how 
the event is interpreted, the assessment of the portfo-
lio’s value will change and the information noise can 
cause the market to expect more volatility. As a result, 
banks may face an unduly high risk premium required 
by the market on their equity and debt (Lee, 1999).
–    If  transparency  is  not  uniform,  e.g.  if  some  inves-
tors receive private signals about the banks’ financial 
condition while others do not, financial stability may 
be endangered. For instance, Chari and Jagannathan 
(1988) develop a model where bank runs reflect a signal 
extraction problem in which some individuals receive a 
noisy signal about the bank’s return, which may lead 
them to withdraw funds early. Other depositors must 
then  infer  from  observed  withdrawals  whether  a 
negative  signal  was  received  by  informed  depositors 
or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. In this 
set-up, bank runs occur because uninformed depositors 
misinterpret  informed  depositors’  liquidity  shocks  as 
bad news about the condition of bank assets. Similarly, 
if banks provide different levels of disclosure in a crisis 
situation, sound banks with poor disclosure levels may 
be wrongly perceived as being risky and may be thus 
adversely affected.
–    If  transparency  is  costly,  e.g.  if  banks  must  support 
direct  or  indirect  costs  to  comply  with  transparency 
requirements, this may undermine their charter value 
hence increase their incentives to take risks and worsen 
the  moral  hazard  problem  (Hyytinnen  and  Takalo, 
2002). 
–    If transparency is established too late, e.g. only after the 
occurrence of a crisis, market participants may interpret 
this  increased  disclosure  as  a  sign  that  bigger  pro- 
blems are to come, which may lead them to overreact 
to  information  about  the  banks’  situation  (Moody’s, 
1998a).
(1)  Problems of asymmetry of information are particularly important for banks given 
that they are more opaque than other firms. As explained in Morgan (2002), 
there are two reasons for this greater opacity. First, banks specialise in lending 
to borrowers on which they gather private information but whose credit quality 
is unknown to the public. Second, banks may invest in certain types of financial 
assets which allow quick and easy trading (e.g. liquid assets), and which are 
therefore hard for investors to monitor.135
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Finally, transparency may also reduce financial stability if 
banks are hit by shocks which are largely independent of 
their portfolios (e.g. macroeconomic shocks). This comes 
from  the  fact  that  investors  will  require  higher  deposit 
rates to be compensated for the shocks ; however, banks 
may  not  necessarily  be  able  to  offset  this  increase  in 
deposit rates by choosing a lower level of risk ex ante, 
which will compound their problems (Cordella and Yeyati, 
1998). 
There  is,  however,  some  empirical  evidence  suggesting 
that, on balance, transparency reduces the probability of a 
banking crisis and thus enhances overall financial stability. 
For instance, Nier (2005) analyses a sample of 550 listed 
banks from 32 countries between 1994 and 2000 and 
finds that banks that disclose more accounting informa-
tion are less likely to suffer severe problems (as proxied 
by large jumps in their stock prices). Another study by 
Tadesse (2005), which uses yearly data for 49 countries 
with 21 crisis episodes between 1990 and 1997, finds 
that increased bank disclosure requirements and stronger 
auditing  regulatory  regimes  reduce  the  likelihood  of  a 
systemic banking crisis.
1.2    Incentives for banks to be transparent 
Obviously, some of banks’ private incentives to disclose infor-
mation  are  intertwined  with  the  above-mentioned  public 
benefits  of  transparency.  One  may  nevertheless  identify 
some additional private benefits of bank transparency. For 
instance, banks may choose to disclose information because 
some  market  participants  (e.g.  investors  and  credit  rating 
agencies) place a greater value on high-disclosure banks, as 
it gives them more confidence in their investment decision-
making or in their risk assessment. As a result, banks which 
choose to disclose information may benefit from a lower risk 
premium on their debt or equity, or from higher credit rat-
ings. Box 1 provides an illustration of the latter case.
At  the  same  time,  banks  may  also  choose  not  to  be 
transparent for several reasons. First, they may have little 
incentive  to  disclose  proprietary  information  since  this 
may reveal competitive strategies or weaknesses. Second, 
banks  may  be  reluctant  to  disclose  information  which 
imposes  additional  compliance  costs  or  administrative 
burdens on them. Third, banks which are suffering from 
temporary  and  recoverable  weaknesses  (e.g.  a  liquidity 
shock) may fear that additional disclosure will aggravate 
market responses, and they may therefore choose not to 
disclose information.
To  sum  up,  this  section  shows  that  while  transparency 
is  socially  desirable  (in  the  sense  that  its  likely  impact 
on  financial  stability  is  positive),  the  interplay  between 
the private benefits and costs of transparency may lead 
banks  to  under  provide  it.  Hence,  it  may  be  necessary 
to impose disclosure requirements either through formal 
rules or guiding principles. The next section discusses the 
disclosure requirements brought about by two important 
regulatory initiatives : Pillar 3 of the Basel II framework and 
the International Financial Reporting Standards.
Box 1  –    An example of how information disclosure may benefit banks – the 
case of credit ratings
This box summarises the credit rating agencies’ perspectives on bank transparency in the general rating process 
and also illustrates how transparency can actually have an impact on unsolicited bank credit ratings, which may in 
turn provide an incentive for banks to disclose information. 
a) the credit rating agencies’ perspective on bank transparency
Moody’s asserts that transparency is an important consideration when rating a bank. A lack of disclosure is indeed 
likely to increase credit risk for two reasons. First, it allows the internal discipline of the company to deteriorate. 
Second, it encourages extreme behaviour, e.g. companies under less public scrutiny may be more aggressive 
because they can hide behind opaque accounts (Moody’s, 1998a and 1999). 
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Moody’s therefore looks at two aspects of disclosure when rating a bank : the extent of disclosure by the bank 
about its operations and the reliability of that disclosure.(1) Moody’s has identified a list of 13 quantitative and 
qualitative disclosure failures which matter both in emerging and developed markets. These are : i) delays in 
financial reporting, ii) the absence of quarterly financial updates, iii) non-standard loss and impairment definitions 
for financial assets, iv) non-homogeneous accounting standards, v) non-consolidation of the results of related 
companies, vi) lack of separate corporate-entity financial statements, vii) misleading treatment of expenses, viii) 
the recognition as current income of future cash flows that have a great degree of uncertainty, ix) undisclosed 
derivatives that could “break” the bank, x) asset or liability exposures not reflected in periodic statements, xi) the 
lack of dissemination of information about material events when they occur , xii) the lack of independence of 
auditors, and xiii) the lack of freedom of expression for independent third parties. 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) uses a framework for assessing firms’ (i.e. not necessarily just banks’) governance, which 
focuses on four major components, including “transparency and disclosure”. As far as the latter component is 
concerned, S&P examines company annual reports to identify more than 100 disclosure items which are grouped 
into three categories : i) ownership structure and investor rights, ii) financial and operational disclosure, and iii) 
board and management structure and process (see S&P, 2004). 
S&P states that the link between its corporate governance scores and credit ratings can be extensive, but is 
often indirect. While there is likely to be a positive correlation between the two measures, this correlation is not 
equal to one and may be stronger or weaker during certain time periods. It should be noted that S&P stopped 
assigning governance scores for US companies in 2004 but has continued to assign these scores for some non-US 
companies.
Although the third player in the credit rating industry, Fitch, does not have any publicly available documentation 
relating to the role of transparency in the bank rating process, a previous director of Fitch’s BankWatch has 
asserted that information disclosure plays an important role when assigning a rating : “As a matter of practice, 
less disclosure tends to be associated with higher risk. In the context of risk assessment, disclosure is not only 
the means by which the assessment is performed, it is also a positive credit consideration in itself” (Golin, 2001, 
p. 535).
In  addition,  there  is  also  anecdotal  evidence  supporting  the  fact  that  transparency  has  an  impact  on  Fitch’s 
bank credit ratings. For instance, Fitch recently claimed that the low rating of a Chinese bank partly reflected its 
“continued poor public transparency and disclosure” (Fitch, 2006). 
b) the empirical impact of bank transparency on credit ratings
Even though the first part of this box clearly shows that rating agencies pay attention to the amount of information 
released by banks when assigning their credit ratings, there is no reason to expect information disclosure alone 
to have a systematic impact on ratings. Indeed, credit ratings are typically based on two types of information : 
public information (obtained from the issuer’s annual report, from its website, etc.) and non-public or “private” 
information  (acquired  during  meetings  with  the  issuer).  Therefore,  disclosure  of  information  may  only  have 
a  significant  impact  on  credit  ratings  for  which  rating  agencies  are  constrained  to  rely  exclusively  on  public 
information and are unable to gather private information from the issuer, e.g. unsolicited ratings. For those 
types of credit ratings, lower information disclosure may lead rating agencies to assign lower ratings due to a 
conservative bias. 
(1)  The first aspect (extent of disclosure) is similar to what the Basel Committee refers to as “disclosure”, while the second aspect (reliability of disclosure) is close to the 
Basel Committee’s definition of “transparency”. 
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2.    Bank transparency and regulatory 
initiatives
Pillar 3 is one of the three pillars of the Basel II framework. 
Its purpose is to complement the other two pillars of the 
framework (minimum capital requirements and supervi-
sory review process) by a set of consistent and compara-
ble disclosure requirements which have the potential to 
increase market discipline on banks. These requirements 
mostly focus on capital and risk disclosures.
The  International  Financial  Reporting  Standards  (IFRS) 
are  a  set  of  accounting  standards  and  interpretations 
established  by  the  International  Accounting  Standards 
Board  (IASB).  Their  overall  aim  is  to  present  a  more 
accurate  picture  of  companies’  (i.e.  not  only  financial 
institutions’)  financial  positions  at  any  given  time.  The 
requirements imposed by some of the IFRS go beyond risk 
disclosures and include, e.g., the disclosure of measure-
ment methods used to value financial assets and liabilities.   
Note  also  that  contrary  to  the  Generally  Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), which are rules-based, IFRS 
are principles-based.(1) 
To  a  certain  extent,  Pillar  3  and  International  Financial 
Reporting Standards have similar goals, as they both aim 
at enhancing the transparency of financial institutions in 
order to enable financial market participants and super-
visors to acquire information and make decisions more 
easily.  This  in  turn  should  enhance  financial  stability.  It 
is therefore not surprising that Pillar 3 and some of the 
standards of the IFRS (most notably IFRS 7) share similar 
disclosure requirements for financial institutions. Sections 
2.1 and 2.2 further detail regarding Pillar 3 and IFRS as 
well as their respective implementation.
The above reasoning is investigated in Van Roy (2006). This paper looks at the impact of disclosure of accounting 
information on a sample of solicited and unsolicited bank ratings assigned by Fitch in Asia. Solicited ratings 
are credit ratings which are requested (and paid for) by issuers and which incorporate both public and private 
information. Unsolicited ratings are credit ratings which are not requested by issuers and which are mostly based 
on public information. Over recent years, several market participants have complained that unsolicited ratings 
seem to be lower than solicited ones, all else being equal. 
Van Roy (2006) confirms that disclosure of information has a significant impact on credit ratings for which public 
information is the main source of information for rating agencies, e.g. the unsolicited ones. Ceteris paribus, the 
difference between the rating of high and low disclosure banks with unsolicited ratings is equal to 2.5 notches 
on average (on a 1 to 9 rating scale), while there is no difference between the rating of high and low disclosure 
banks with solicited ratings.  (1) The study further highlights the role of disclosure in the bank credit rating process 
by showing that banks with unsolicited ratings and with high levels of disclosure receive ratings which are not 
significantly different from those of similar banks with solicited ratings. However, banks with low disclosure and 
unsolicited ratings have ratings which are significantly lower than those of similar banks with solicited ratings 
(3.4 notches on average). Thus, there are reasons to believe that disclosure of information may account for the 
difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings which has been noted by market participants.
Taken as a whole, these findings should provide an incentive for bank managers to disclose information, as they 
show that disclosure not only appears to have a positive effect on the credit rating of banks with unsolicited 
ratings, but that it also eliminates the alleged downward bias of unsolicited ratings. This result is particularly 
interesting in light of the fact that one of the main objectives of Pillar 3 of the Basel II framework is to encourage 
public disclosure by banks (see Section 2.1). 
(1)  The figures in this paragraph are taken from a revised version of the paper available from the author. This version provides evidence that the above-mentioned 
results hold in a more international sample, which contains S&P’s credit ratings of banks located in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.
(1)  The advantage of principles-based over rules-based accounting standards is that 
they may allow for financial innovation more easily. Their disadvantage, however, 
is that they may leave room for interpretation and therefore be difficult to 
enforce.138
2.1  Pillar 3 of the Basel II framework
As mentioned above, the aim of Pillar 3 is to enhance 
market discipline through greater disclosure. Table 1 (in 
the Annex) shows that the disclosure requirements under 
Pillar 3 consist of quantitative and qualitative information 
which falls under five areas : general disclosure principle, 
scope of application, capital structure, capital adequacy 
and risk exposure. The table also contains some examples 
of qualitative and quantitative disclosure requirements for 
each area.
More specifically, the general disclosure principles and the 
scope of application areas mostly deal with the existence 
of a formal disclosure policy and the level of the banking 
group at which it is applied ; the capital structure area 
refers to a discussion of the main features of the capital 
instruments held by the bank, as well as how much capi-
tal is held ; while the capital adequacy area corresponds 
to  a  discussion  of  the  bank’s  approach  to  assessing   
its capital adequacy and to a quantitative disclosure of   
its capital requirements for different types of risk. 
The last disclosure area (risk exposure) is the most impor-
tant one. It consists of general disclosure requirements 
regarding  the  bank’s  risk  management  objective  and 
policies for credit risk, market risk, operational risk, risk 
from equity positions and interest rate risk, and specific 
disclosure  requirements  for  each  of  these  five  types  of 
risk. It should be noted that for credit risk and market risk, 
the bank has a choice of method for computing required 
capital,  and  the  disclosure  requirements  are  specific  to 
the method chosen. It is also important to mention that 
Pillar 3 does not include disclosure requirements for liquid-
ity risk. This has led some observers to question whether 
such  requirements  could  have  helped  restore  market 
confidence  earlier  on  in  the  subprime  mortgage  crisis   
(Box  2  further  discusses  issues  involved  with  the  mea-
surement of liquidity risk). Furthermore, Pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements  with  respect  to  securitisation  exposures 
are  quite  limited,  as  they  mostly  focus  on  banks’  total 
outstanding  exposures  that  have  been  securitised,  as 
well as on the corresponding capital charge. The Basel 
Committee will issue revised guidelines for the manage-
ment and supervision of liquidity risk in July 2008 and will 
also  promote  enhanced  disclosures  relating  to  complex 
securitisation exposures. 
As  far  as  regulatory  implementation  is  concerned, 
Pillar 3 has been implemented in many EU countries since 
1  January  2008  via  the  Capital  Requirements  Directive 
(CRD). Although the CRD allows national authorities to 
use specific means of verification for the disclosures not 
covered by statutory audits, only a minority of countries 
apply  stricter  provisions  either  via  internal  or  external 
auditors. Given that Pillar 3 is quite flexible in terms of 
medium and location of disclosure, it is also expected that 
a majority of banks will choose to make the disclosures in 
their annual and interim financial statements, apart from 
selected information (e.g. capital adequacy), which needs 
to be reported on a quarterly basis through other media.
Finally,  the  Committee  of  European  Banking  Supervisors 
(CEBS) recently published a report on the implementation 
of  Pillar  3  (CEBS,  2007),  with  the  overall  message  that 
Pillar 3 does not give rise to major concerns in Europe. The 
report nevertheless points to a small number of areas that 
need further attention and proposes follow-up work, in 
particular on the application of the disclosure requirements 
to (significant) subsidiaries and on investigating the poten-
tial for a solution where limited disclosure is being provided 
with  a  subsidiary’s  (individual)  financial  statements.  An 
additional open issue is the relationship between Pillar 3 
and accounting standards (see Section 2.2).
Box 2  –  Banks’ disclosure on liquidity risk  (1)
Discussions about the type and depth of banks’ disclosure to markets typically focus on solvency risks. Liquidity 
risks feature less prominently. Yet, when there is uncertainty and imperfect information that afflict both lenders 
and borrowers, as during the 2007 / 2008 structured-finance-related stresses, disclosure on the degree of banks’ 
liquidity risk might help restore market confidence. This box briefly sets out current practices before highlighting 
some of the contentious issues in this domain.
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As  hinted  in  Section  2.1,  in  terms  of  international  regulation,  there  are  few  concrete  mandatory  disclosure 
requirements  on  liquidity.  Disclosure  on  the  quantification  of  liquidity  risk  is  limited  to  contractual  liquidity 
schedules of assets and liabilities for different maturity buckets and does not explicitly reveal the size of liquidity 
buffers. However, banks report disaggregated assets, and databases such as Bankscope use this information and 
the maturity schedules to compute seemingly comparable narrow and broad liquidity measures. Also, many large 
banks disclose qualitative information about their liquidity practices. In the case of Belgium, while the details vary, 
banks describe in their annual reports the main pillars of liquidity risk policies : objectives of liquidity management, 
organisational structure, processes and metrics for managing liquidity risk, stress testing, limits and contingency 
funding plans. The content covers, e.g., diversification of funding sources, the role of liquidity buffers and stress 
tests, the allocation of responsibilities, how central and local liquidity processes complement each other, how limits 
are derived and what they refer to.
One question that arises is whether this level of transparency is enough for the various stakeholders to paint 
an accurate picture about liquidity risks in the banking sector. Firstly, starting off with quantitative information, 
there are two general shortcomings. The contractual maturity schedules divulge little about real expected liquidity 
gaps in normal times and / or under stress and the policies in place to manage these gaps ; moreover, contingent 
claims and sources are excluded. And, in terms of funding risk, while there is information on the maturity of 
funding sources, this does not reveal much about the ease with which these sources could be renewed and how 
concentrated they are. 
Comparability is also hampered by different liquidity management choices of banks. Some banks centralise certain 
aspects of liquidity management, which of course affects liquidity ratios of the individual entities and of the 
consolidating group. A measure at group level may be more appropriate if liquidity can easily circulate among all 
the entities of a group, if there are no legal obstacles to its transfer across national borders and if solidarity among 
all the group entities is ensured. In practice, liquidity of some subsidiaries would need to be considered stand-
alone, while that of others ought to be integrated into the group. Outside analysts, of course, have insufficient 
information to gauge what degree of centralisation in measuring liquidity buffers is appropriate.
Turning to qualitative information, which is particularly important in light of the aforementioned data limitations, 
it seems even harder to reach relevant conclusions across banks. For example, taking public disclosure on stress-
testing, it is difficult for external parties to assess whether a bank’s stress test assumptions are internally consistent 
and appropriate and how the severity of assumed shocks compares across banks. The same holds for descriptions 
of banks’ liquidity management principles more generally. These are difficult for an outside investor to interpret : 
one bank, for example, may say it sets limits on its unsecured funding gap without explaining how these are 
derived, while another may set limits on the basis of distressed liquidity scenarios without stipulating on what 
type of gaps.
Given that liquidity is volatile and fast-changing, the question relating to the frequency at which information 
should be provided is also an important one. Annual reports are of course backward looking and most banks only 
provide one-point-in-time year-end information on their maturity gaps. 
But comprehensive, comparable and timely information is necessary to allow investors and depositors to gauge 
a bank’s liquidity risk tolerance and to exert the relevant market discipline. In many countries, supervisors have 
access to such information. In Belgium, for example, the scope of regular liquidity reporting to supervisors has 
recently been enhanced, improving the monitoring of different banks’ liquidity risks (Janssens et al., 2007). 
However, precisely because of its volatile nature, high-frequency liquidity information can easily be misinterpreted 
and  thus  create  destabilising  “noise”  in  markets.  According  to  a  recent  survey  conducted  by  the  Banking 
Supervision  Committee  among  European  banks,  there  is  considerable  reluctance  to  provide  comprehensive 
disclosure on stress tests and contingency funding plans. None of the large Belgian banks provide quantitative 
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2.2    International Financial Reporting Standards
This section focuses on two international financial report-
ing  standards  which  are  of  particular  importance  for 
the  topic  of  disclosure  in  banking :  IAS  39  (financial 
instruments : recognition and measurement) and IFRS 7 
(financial instruments : disclosures). It further shows the 
connection between Pillar 3 and IFRS 7, which share some 
similar features.
The  objective  of  IAS  39,  effective  in  the  EU  since 
1 January 2005, is to establish principles for recognising 
and  measuring  financial  assets  and  liabilities  of  firms, 
including  derivatives.  More  specifically,  IAS  39  foresees 
that all financial assets and liabilities must be recognised 
in the balance sheet and classified into one of six catego-
ries : i) financial assets at fair value through profit or loss, ii) 
held-to-maturity investments, iii) loans and receivables, iv) 
available-for-sale financial assets, v) financial liabilities at 
fair value through profit or loss, and vi) financial liabilities 
at amortised cost.(1) This classification thus determines the 
measurement method of each item (at cost, at amortised 
cost or at fair value) and where the gain or loss should be 
recognised (either in profit or loss or in reserves). The dis-
closure of each measurement method will assist users of 
financial statements in understanding the extent to which 
accounting policies affect the amounts at which financial 
assets and liabilities are recognised. 
The objective of IFRS 7, which has been in force in the 
EU since 1 January 2007, is to require entities to provide 
disclosures in their financial statements that enable users 
to evaluate, first, the significance of financial instruments 
for the entity’s financial position and performance, and 
second, the nature and extent of risks arising from finan-
cial instruments to which the entity is exposed during the 
period and at the reporting date, and how the entities 
manage those risks. Table 2 (in the Annex) further details 
the  qualitative  and  quantitative  disclosure  requirements 
for credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk imposed under 
IFRS 7. 
As shown in Table 2, there are several areas of conver-
gence between the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 and 
Pillar 3. For instance, most of the qualitative disclosures 
related  to  credit  risk  and  market  risk  can  be  aligned. 
Similarly, there is a considerable volume of quantitative 
disclosures  that  overlap,  such  as  the  analyses  of  credit 
risk  exposures  and  value-at-risk  measures.  However, 
IFRS 7 does not cover operational risk while Pillar 3 does 
not address liquidity risk (as mentioned above, the Basel 
Committee  is  nevertheless  working  on  strengthening 
banks’ management of liquidity risk and should issue new 
standards in July 2008).  
The  above-mentioned  similarities  between  IFRS  7  and 
Pillar 3 have been noted by the Basel Committee, which 
states that “in situations where the disclosures are made 
under  accounting  requirements  or  are  made  to  satisfy 
listing requirements promulgated by securities regulators, 
banks may rely on them to fulfil the applicable Pillar 3 
expectations” (Basel Committee, 2006, p. 227). Likewise, 
authorities  in  charge  of  the  implementation  of  IFRS 
in  their  respective  countries  have  published  guidelines 
which are consistent with those published by the Basel 
Committee for Pillar 3. As a result, banks can prepare a 
single coordinated set of disclosures dealing with finan-
cial risk. It should nevertheless be noted that, contrary to 
Pillar 3, IFRS 7 will be required to be audited by external 
auditors.
As  far  as  regulatory  implementation  is  concerned,  the 
move  towards  IFRS  in  the  EU  has  been  made  in  two 
parallel  and  interlocking  ways :  the  Fair  Value  Directive 
and an IAS Regulation approach. However, there are still 
details on their stress tests. Besides, there is a risk that solvent institutions – but with a temporarily vulnerable 
liquidity position – could be subject to runs and predatory liquidity curtailment by cash-rich institutions if they had 
to disclose their positions. 
More generally, the liquidity shortages experienced in 2007 and early 2008 raise the question of whether the 
market really can play a disciplining role as regards banks’ liquidity management. Presumably, Northern Rock’s 
wholesale funding market concentration risks were well known to the market, but it nevertheless failed to punish 
the bank with higher borrowing costs in earlier years. The usefulness of market discipline and disclosure as regards 
liquidity management thus remains an open issue.
(1)  Fair value is defined as “the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, 
or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s-length 
transaction (IASB, 2008).141
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a number of practical challenges regarding, for example, 
the implementation of IFRS 7. Most of these are due to 
differences  in  concepts,  measurements,  and  methods 
between Pillar 3 and IFRS 7. For instance, although Basel II 
and IFRS are both to be applied at the consolidated level, 
consolidation criteria differ between the two regulatory 
arrangements.(1)  The  banking  industry  is  therefore  wor-
king to align, as far as possible, the concepts used in the 
disclosures (CEBS, 2007). 
Interestingly, an analysis of the IFRS financial statements 
of  200  EU  publicly-traded  companies  was  recently  car-
ried out at the request of the European Commission (see 
Financial  Reporting  Faculty,  2007).  The  results  for  the 
29 banks included in the study revealed that, while all of 
them disclosed their principal accounting policy, some did 
not disclose policies for all relevant instrument issues. It 
was also noted that all sample banks provided disclosures 
of their risk management policies and various types of 
risk, as required by IFRS 7. 
3.    Bank transparency and the subprime 
mortgage crisis 
This section focuses on the recent turbulence in the credit 
markets  following  the  outbreak  of  the  subprime  mort-
gage crisis. This episode is interesting because it provides 
an illustration of the importance of bank transparency for 
financial stability and because it highlights which addi-
tional disclosure requirements might be desirable relative 
to those already specified under Pillar 3 and IFRS. 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  some  banks  were 
severely  criticised  during  the  2007 / 2008  crisis  for  not 
being transparent enough about their subprime-related 
exposures and not publishing rapidly enough their write-
downs and losses. Informal evidence gathered from major 
European and US banks’ quarterly reports confirms that 
banks generally did not disclose information about their 
subprime-related  exposures  in  their  second  quarterly 
report and only became more transparent in their third 
and  fourth  quarterly  reports.  In  addition,  information 
about subprime-related exposures was often incomplete 
and  differed  widely  across  institutions.  For  example, 
only  a  minority  of  banks  disclosed  the  distribution  of 
their  subprime-related  exposures  by  type  of  instrument   
(e.g. RMBS, ABS CDO) in addition to reporting their total 
exposure. Also, there were notable differences between 
banks  regarding  the  disclosure  of  their  unconsolidated 
exposures through SIVs and ABCP conduits. More gene-
rally, comprehensive explanations on the origin of expo-
sures  (e.g.  whether  they  were  originated,  retained  or 
purchased) were often lacking.
As  far  as  write-downs  and  losses  on  subprime-related 
securities are concerned, the following observations can 
be made. First, the write-downs initially released by banks 
were relatively low. Second, significant differences could 
be observed in the write-down policy adopted by some 
banks  with  comparable  exposures  to  the  US  subprime 
market. Third, it was not always easy to infer with cer-
tainty whether the figures released by banks represented 
write-downs or actual losses. 
Consistent  with  the  theoretical  literature  reviewed  in 
Section  1,  this  lack  of  transparency  about  exposures, 
write-downs and losses exacerbated problems of asym-
metry of information between banks on the one hand 
and  depositors,  investors  and  supervisors  on  the  other 
hand, and also between banks themselves. As a result, 
liquidity dried up in the interbank market and the shares 
of some banks were severely affected, which further led 
to an amplification of systemic risk.
The  above-mentioned  transparency  shortcomings  are 
not,  however,  necessarily  intentional  and  could  have 
different explanations. First, the absence of active and 
liquid markets for subprime-related exposures and the 
complexity of the relationship between the payoffs of 
these  instruments  and  their  underlying  value  drivers 
made it difficult for banks to value them. Second, dif-
ferent  assumptions  underlined  banks’  valuations  and 
resulted in significant differences between their write-
downs.  (2) Third, some banks managed to decrease their 
overall write-downs as some of the hedging positions 
which they took to protect their risky exposures turned 
out to be profitable. These different elements undoubt-
edly contributed to fuelling market and regulatory uncer-
tainty about the exact magnitude of losses sustained by 
individual institutions. 
Some observers have nevertheless argued that banks could 
have acted more decisively to alleviate this uncertainty. 
For instance, banks could have been more forthcoming 
with information regarding their valuations and the sen-
sitivity of these valuations to changes in key assumptions. 
Similarly,  banks  could  have  disclosed  more  information 
about the use of mark to market value for some of their 
positions. Finally, some banks could have been quicker to 
report estimates for their exposures and losses and should 
not have waited for market pressure to materialise.
(1)  From the perspective of banking supervision, consolidation embraces only those 
companies of a group that conduct banking and other financial operations. 
This is only a fraction of the entities included in consolidation according to the 
accounting standards. 
(2)  Differences in write-downs across banks can be further explained by differences 
in vintages held by these banks but also by differences in hedging strategies  
(e.g. purchase of CDS protection), portfolio correlations, etc. 142
Against  this  background,  several  regulatory  initiatives 
have been launched to investigate whether the disclosure 
requirements  imposed  by  Pillar  3  and  IFRS  may  need 
to be strengthened. For instance, the Financial Stability 
Forum (a group established by G7 finance ministers and 
central bank governors and which consists of a number 
of authorities responsible for financial stability) released 
a report on “market and institutional resilience” in April 
2008. 
This report sets out recommendations to improve, among 
other  things,  risk  disclosures  by  market  participants, 
accounting  and  disclosure  standards  for  off-balance-
sheet  entities,  valuation  techniques,  and  transparency 
in  securitisation  processes  and  markets.  Most  of  these 
recommendations involve the participation of regulators 
and market participants and should be implemented in 
the period 2008-2009. For instance, the report foresees 
that the Basel Committee will issue further guidance to 
strengthen disclosure requirements under Pillar 3. 
On the topic of valuation, the report recommends that 
the IASB strengthen its standards to achieve better dis-
closures about valuations, methodologies and the uncer-
tainty associated with valuations. The IASB should also 
enhance  its  guidance  on  valuing  financial  instruments 
when  markets  are  no  longer  active.  Indeed,  fair  value 
accounting requires banks to mark to market their expo-
sures. However, this may prove to be an issue when there 
are no market prices available, as it has been the case for 
subprime-related securities in recent months. Several insti-
tutions (see e.g. IMF, 2008) have also suggested finding 
better ways to apply fair value through the cycle so as to 
mitigate its pro-cyclical character.       
It  is  important  to  point  out  that  most  of  the  above-
mentioned recommendations aim at a greater disclosure 
of banks’ valuation methods and accounting standards, 
and not necessarily at wider harmonisation. This focus 
on greater transparency (rather than on greater unifor-
mity) seems sensible for at least two reasons. First, it is 
unclear whether a uniform approach to those issues is 
feasible, given that, for some types of instruments, there 
is little if any past history to decide on what the “best” 
valuation  or  accounting  standard  might  be.  Second, 
even if valuations and accounting policies were identi-
cal across instruments and institutions, variations in the 
disclosure of exposures and write-downs, for instance, 
would  still  generate  uncertainty  among  market  par-
ticipants and authorities. In this respect, transparency is 
already a desirable objective in itself. As a result, it may 
be appropriate for regulators working on those issues to 
be cautious and to accord some latitude to banks, e.g. 
in the strict application of fair value accounting during 
stressful  events  (provided  that  appropriate  disclosures 
are made). 
Conclusion 
This article focuses on the role of transparency in banking. 
After surveying arguments relating to bank transparency 
and financial stability, it summarises two recent regula-
tory standards which have had an impact on disclosure 
among banks : Pillar 3 of the Basel II framework and the 
International  Financial  Reporting  Standards.  The  article 
also  examines  the  recent  credit  turmoil  in  light  of  the 
arguments relating to transparency. More specifically, it 
discusses how heterogeneous levels of disclosure across 
banks have likely impacted the turmoil. 
A question that naturally arises is whether Pillar 3 could 
have helped to avoid some of the problems caused by 
heterogeneous disclosure had it been implemented ear-
lier. Given that Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for securi-
tisation exposures are quite limited, the answer is likely to 
be negative. As a result, several regulatory initiatives have 
been launched to strengthen Pillar 3 as well as to improve 
valuations and accounting standards. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that, to some extent, bank 
transparency is a moving target, since it is very hard for 
regulators to predict which types of disclosures may be 
warranted in advance of a crisis. In a similar way, requi-
ring  the  disclosure  of  a  pre-defined  list  of  bank  items 
may not necessarily be optimal, as the order of priority 
of these items may change over time. One potential way 
to address this concern would therefore be, for any new 
regulatory arrangement, to adopt a more forward-looking 
approach, e.g. by requiring banks to systematically dis-
close information about their fast-growing business lines 
or  sources  of  revenues.  Although  global  CDO  issuance 
more than tripled between 2004 and 2006, few banks 
actually disclosed detailed information about their hold-
ings  of  CDOs  or  the  risks  involved.  Disclosures  of  this 
type  may  help  regulators  and  market  participants  to 
better assess any new developments that could have an 
adverse effect on banks. In addition, any future regulation 
aiming at addressing existing transparency shortcomings   
should  also  ensure  that  disclosure  requirements  cover 
the entire on-balance- and off-balance-sheet activities of 
banks and that they are not limited to capital but also 
address  liquidity  risk.  Of  course,  these  various  sugges-
tions  may  not  entirely  eliminate  financial  crises  in  the 
future but they may, at least, help to improve the existing   
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1.  General disclosure 
principles
Formal disclosure policy approved by the board 
of directors
None
2.  Scope of application Name of the corporate entity to which the 
requirements apply, outline of differences in 
the basis of consolidation for accounting and 
regulatory purposes
Aggregate amount of surplus capital of 
insurance subsidiaries included in the capital of 
the consolidated group, etc.
3.  Capital structure Terms and conditions of the main features of all 
capital instruments
Amount of tier 1 capital (with separate 
disclosures), tier 2 and tier 3 capital, other 
deductions from capital, and total eligible capital
4.  Capital adequacy Discussion of the bank’s approach to assessing 
the adequacy of its capital to support current 
and future activities
Capital requirements for :
 i)  credit risk
 ii)  equity exposures in the IRB approach
  iii)  market risk
  iv)  operational risk
Total and tier 1 capital ratio
5.  Risk exposure
a)  General requirements For each type of risk listed below, description of : None
 i)  strategies and processes
 ii)  structure and organisation of the relevant risk 
management function
  iii)  scope and nature of risk reporting and / or 
measurement systems
  iv)  hedging / risk mitigating policies and 
strategies / processes for monitoring their 
effectiveness
b)  Credit risk
General principles The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to credit risk (see 5.a), including deﬁnitions of 
past due and impaired, description of approaches 
followed for speciﬁc and general allowances 
and statistical methods, discussion of the bank’s 
credit risk management policy, etc.
Total gross credit risk exposures, geographic 
and industry / counterparty type distribution 
of exposures, residual contractual maturity 
breakdown of the whole portfolio, etc.
SA and supervisory  
risk-weights  
in the IRB
For portfolios under the standardised approach, 
information related to the ECAIs and ECAs used 
for risk-weighting purposes (names, types of 
exposures risk-weighted, etc.)





Supervisor’s acceptance of approach, structure 
of internal rating systems and description of 
the internal rating process for ﬁve portfolios 
(corporate, equities, residential mortgages, 
qualifying revolving retail and other retail)
For each of the ﬁve portfolios except retail, 
information such as total exposures across a 
sufﬁcient number of PD grades, actual losses, 
etc.
Note :  ECAIs : external credit assessment institutions ; ECAs : export credit agencies ; SA : standardised approach ; IRB : internal ratings-based approaches ; CCR : counterparty 
credit risk ; IMA : internal models approach ; IRRBB : interest rate in risk the banking book.
Source : Basel Committee (2006).
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Credit risk  
mitigation,  
SA and IRB
The general disclosure requirements with 
respect to credit risk mitigation (see 5.a), 
including policies and processes for on- and 
off-balance sheet netting and for collateral 
valuation and management, main types of 
collateral taken by the bank, main types of 
guarantor / credit derivative counterparty and 
their creditworthiness, information about risk 
concentrations within the mitigation taken
For each separately disclosed credit risk portfolio 
under the standardised and/or foundation IRB 
approach, the total exposure covered by eligible 
collateral ; for each separately disclosed portfolio 
under the standardised and / or IRB approach, 




The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to derivatives and CCR (see among others 5.a), 
including a discussion of the methodology used 
to assign economic capital and credit limits, 
policies for securing collateral and establishing 
credit reserves, policies with respect to wrong-
way risk exposures, etc.
Gross positive fair value of contracts, netting 
beneﬁts, netted current credit exposure, collateral 
held and net derivatives credit exposure ; 
measures for exposure at default or exposure 




The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to securitisation (see 5.a), including a discussion 
of the bank’s objectives in relation to its 
securitisation activity and the roles played by the 
bank in the securitisation process ; a summary of 
the bank’s accounting policies for securitisation 
activities, names of ECAIs used for securitisations 
and types of securitisation exposure for which 
each agency is used
Total outstanding exposures securitised by the 
bank and subject to the securitisation framework 
(including amount of impaired / past due assets 
securitised and losses recognised), aggregate 
amount of securitisation exposures (retained or 
purchased) and associated IRB capital charges, 
etc.
c)  Market risk
SA The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to market risk (see 5.a), including the portfolios 
covered by the SA
Capital requirements for :
 i)  interest rate risk
 ii)  equity position risk
  iii)  foreign exchange risk
  iv)  commodity risk
IMA  
(trading portfolio)
The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to market risk (see 5.a), including the portfolios 
covered by the IMA ; other speciﬁc disclosure 
requirements
High, mean and low VaR values over the 
reporting period and period-end, comparison 
of VaR estimates with actual gains / losses 
experienced by the bank
d)  Operational risk The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to operational risk (see 5.a) and the approach(es) 
for operational risk for which the bank qualiﬁes ; 
other speciﬁc disclosure requirements
None
e)  Equities risk  
(banking portfolio)
The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to equities risk (see 5.a) including differentiation 
between holdings, discussion of important 
policies covering the valuation and accounting of 
equity holdings
Value disclosed in the balance sheet of 
investments, types and nature of investments 
(publicly traded vs. privately held), cumulative 
(un)realised gains (or losses), total latent 
revaluation gains (or losses), etc.
f)  Interest rate risk  
(banking portfolio)
The general disclosure requirements with respect 
to interest rate risk (see 5.a), including the 
nature of IRRBB and key assumptions
Change in earnings or economic value for 
upward and downward rate shocks according to 
management’s method for measuring IRRBB
Note :  ECAIs : external credit assessment institutions ; ECAs : export credit agencies ; SA : standardised approach ; IRB : internal ratings-based approaches ; CCR : counterparty 
credit risk ; IMA : internal models approach ; IRRBB : interest rate in risk the banking book.
Source : Basel Committee (2006).
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TABLE  2  DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER IFRS 7
 
Qualitative requirements
Disclosures related to the nature and extent of risks arising from ﬁnancial instruments are required for each type of risk  
(e.g. credit risk, liquidity risk) and include :
–  the exposures to risks and how they arise ;
–  the entity’s objectives, policies, processes and methods used for managing and measuring the risks.
Quantitative requirements
The level of detail of quantitative disclosure should be based on the information provided internally to key management  
of the entity (e.g., board of directors, CEO). Quantitative disclosures are required at a minimum in respect of credit risk,  
liquidity risk and market risk.
Required credit risk disclosures include :
–  the reporting entity’s maximum exposure without taking account of collateral or credit enhancements and a description of  
any collateral and credit enhancements ; 
–  the credit quality of ﬁnancial assets that are neither past due nor impaired ;
–  the carrying amount of ﬁnancial assets with renegotiated terms that otherwise would be past due.
Required liquidity risk disclosures include a contractual maturity analysis for ﬁnancial liabilities.
Required market risk disclosures include :
–  a sensitivity analysis for each type of market risk (e.g., currency risk, interest rate risk and other price risk) showing how proﬁt  
or loss and equity would have been affected by changes in he relevant risk variables, and methods and assumptions used  
in preparing such sensitivity analyses ;
–  for entities that prepare sensitivity analyses reﬂecting interdependencies between risk variables, such as value-at-risk, and use  
such sensitivity analyses to provide the disclosures required by IFRS 7, the standard requires the entity to provide an explanation  
of the method used in preparing the analysis, its objectives and limitations, and the main parameters and assumptions used.
If the quantitative disclosures do not result in providing the information representative of an entity’s exposure to risk,  
then an entity has to provide further information that is representative.
Source : IASB (2007).
 